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I. INTRODUCTION
“Resist!”1
- Duncan Kennedy
I am disappointed in the legal education I have received.2 I entered law school with
training in Catholic social teaching, liberation theology, creative nonviolence and the Catholic
Worker Movement.3 In many ways the training was unsettling. My service learning experiences
exposed me to the human suffering that accompanies systemic forms of subordination and
discrimination. Reconciling such harsh realities with my own lived experience, as the white son
of a Mayo Clinic surgeon, is an ongoing struggle. I have not, however, struggled alone. My
collegiate experiences exposed me to dynamic communities of scholars, activists and friends, all
committed to fighting for social justice. Similarly to Eamon Joyce’s expectations of law school, I
hoped to “utilize these tools and theories in the law school context, challenging the Master’s
voice in many of the languages of the Master.”4 After nearly two years of legal inculcation, many
of my hopes have been dashed.
My hopes have been replaced by a legal academe that pushes discussion of race, class
and economic inequality to the periphery.5 In my own view, it is the immensity of silence that is
disconcerting. The fact that I did not formally study critical race theory until well into the second
year of my legal education is a testament to the institutional hostility to outsider scholarship.6
The experience has been demobilizing. I rarely feel intellectually engaged in the
classroom. I often sit in class bored and leave tired, disillusioned. I think much of my fatigue
emanates from what Duncan Kennedy has described as the experience of double surrender.7 As
explained by Kennedy:
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The actual intellectual content of the law seems to consist of learning the rules,
what they are and why they have to be the way they are, while rooting for the
occasional judge who seems willing to make them marginally more humane. The
basic experience is of double surrender: to a passivizing classroom experience and
to a passive attitude toward the content of the legal system.8
I did not resist. I had qualms about the way issues were discussed but I adapted, I
acquiesced to the system. I read the cases. I learned the nuances of case analysis. I learned the
rules and how to apply them. I learned the basics of legal reasoning. I got by.
If my Property I grade was any indication, I was certainly not the “extraordinary first year
student who could, on his or her own, develop a theoretically critical attitude toward this
system.”9 Yet I wanted to. I felt stymied by the decontextualized analyses of cases that led to
contrived classroom discussions devoid of any political, theoretical or historical meaning. These
experiences encouraged me to question the system of legal rules and reasoning that everyone was
simply taught to accept.10
Duncan Kennedy has described the implicit messages embodied within the formal legal
curriculum as “nonsense.”11 This paper is an attempt to draw meaning from this body of
nonsense. It is a personal attempt to embrace Duncan Kennedy’s call for resistance.12 It is a
product of my frustrations with a disappointing law school experience.
This paper argues that the dominant legal pedagogy, the case-dialogue method,
perpetuates white privilege through active subordination of minority law students. The paper is
divided into five sections. Part I explores the history of the case-dialogue method. This section
begins with a discussion of the case-dialogue’s historical origins and development. Part I
concludes with a description of the case-dialogue method and a discussion of the pedagogy’s
early criticisms. Part II exposes the fundamental presumption of the case-dialogue method – the
objectivity of legal analysis – as false. Part III analyzes the dynamics of white privilege. Whites’
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unconsciousness of whiteness, the reality of white privilege and the need to confront racial
subordination with race consciousness are all discussed. Part IV analyzes how the case-dialogue
method’s incorrect presumption of objectivity operates as a white perspective. Part IV concludes
by analyzing how this analytical method subordinates minority law students in the classroom.
Part V puts forth a number of suggestions for pedagogical change that would confront the
existence of white privilege in legal education.
II. A HISTORY OF THE CASE-DIALOGUE METHOD
“Many law professors are conscientious and devoted teachers, and quite a few
are inspired ones, but their efforts are constrained and hobbled by an educational
model that treats the entire twentieth century as little more than a passing
annoyance.” 13
-

Edward Rubin

The nineteenth century was a period of uncertainty in American legal education.14 There
was not a uniform approach for teaching the law.15 Many students focused on the scholarly
aspects of the law and studied philosophy and Roman law in conjunction with their studies of
substantive American law.16 Other law students forwent a formal classroom education and
learned the law by apprenticeships.17 The popularity of legal apprenticeships threatened the very
existence of law schools.18 Universities saw little scholarly value in the study of law because it
was seen as a craft, not an academic subject.19 The strongest critics believed that law schools
should be abolished in favor of a straight apprenticeship program.20
Christopher Langdell’s appointment to the deanship at Harvard in 1870 ended any
possibility of law school’s demise as an institution.21 Langdell regarded the law as a science in
its own right.22 As a science, Langdell perceived the law as a coherent body of rules.23 To find
the rules, students must consult authoritative sources, such as the Constitution or judicial
31
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opinions.24 Langdell believed that “scientific” legal principles could be found by studying these
authoritative sources.25 Edward Rubin provides a succinct explanation of Langdell’s perspective
on the law:
To study the law, according to the curricular innovations that Langdell
introduced, meant to discern the principles that determined good decisions and
gave those decisions coherence. To improve the law meant to alter or overrule
judicial decisions that conflicted with those principles so that the totality of
decisions formed a conceptually coherent unit. This framework permitted the
analogy between the study of law and the study of natural science.26
A scientific inquiry, in Langdell’s view, started and stopped with the analysis of authoritative
sources such as appellate court decisions.27 The focus on court cases in law school curriculum
became known as the case-dialogue method.28
The formal introduction of Langdell’s case-dialogue method occurred the same year
Langdell assumed the deanship, 1870.29 Viewing law through the prism of “science” provided
additional scholarly legitimacy to the subject.30 Concerns over the scholarliness of the law
dissipated and law schools across the country adopted the case-dialogue method.31
Langdell’s broad decision to limit the study of law to case reports had a fair share of
practical problems.32 Certainly, students could not read all the case reports on a subject.33
Langdell solved this problem by creating casebooks that included only a select number of legal
decisions.34 Kara Abramson described Langdell’s casebooks as such: “Not all legal decisions
were fair game in his pedagogic vision, however. Instead, he selected only a few designed to
reveal a body of doctrine or illustrate mistaken deviations from the rules.”35
Langdell was also confronted with a decision regarding the appropriate role of the law
professor.36 Langdell believed that an examination of original sources would not be scientific if it
simply involved rote memorization of facts and rules.37 Langdell decided to abandon traditional
lecturing and adopt the “Socratic method.”38 Instead of lecturing, professors would ask the
32
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students to provide a case’s facts, procedural history, legal issue, and reasoning.39 Students
discovered the necessary rules and principles of a subject through their Socratic dialogue with
the professor.40
By the early twentieth century, Langdell’s case-dialogue method became the norm in
American law schools.41 Remarkably, despite over a century of history, Langdell’s case-dialogue
method continues to be the dominant pedagogical tool in the modern law school classroom.42
John Sexton discusses the resiliency of Langdell’s pedagogical approach:
What is surprising is that, in the face of seismic changes in the world of law
practice, it has taken so long for the conversation [about reforming U.S. legal
education] to begin – and that our pedagogy has remained unchanged for over 100
years. True, the last three decades have seen the development of clinical legal
education and interdisciplinary work; but these pedagogies have matured within
the traditional framework, with the actual change being at the margins.43
As alluded to by John Sexton, there have been challenges to Langdell’s pedagogy.44 In
the 1920’s, legal realists challenged Langdell’s view of the law as a distinct science.45 Legal
realists related the law to the social environment in which it originated.46 Realists believed that
fundamental legal rules and principles meant little if they were not analyzed within a broader
social context.47 Langdell’s “scientific” inquiry, however, did not move beyond the facts and
reasoning contained in a court’s opinion.48 Realists believed such reasoning was narrow and
constrained.49 Despite legal realists’ challenge to Langdell’s approach, law schools continued to
employ Langell’s methods in their classrooms.50
Developments over the last fifty years have also challenged the predominance of
Langdell’s pedagogy in the law school classroom.51 Schools have adopted more electives and
courses involving clinical work.52 New pedagogies have been introduced such as the problem
method and the inclusion of broad introductory legal courses.53 However, as described by Kara
33
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Abramson, these changes have represented “more of an ornament atop the dominant Langdellian
cast of legal education rather than a replacement of it.” 54
Every law student who has been asked to recite the material substantive facts of Palsgraf,
or to explain the court’s reasoning in Erie Railroad, has been touched by Langdell’s legacy.
Langdell’s case-dialogue method pedagogy continues to stand as the overarching framework for
teaching law students how to “think like a lawyer.”
III. THE FALSE PRESUMPTION OF THE CASE-DIALOGUE METHOD
“There is a real danger that inculcation into a legal culture - learning the rules of
the game - can divert the initiates into a love of legal reasoning for its own sake.
Seduced by the search for elegance and coherence and obsessed with technique,
they lose sight of the ends and purposes which the law is intended to serve.”55
-

Michael Cooper

Law students are often told that they are being trained to think like lawyers. Thinking like
a lawyer is commonly understood as a form of critical thinking used to solve legal problems.56
The distinction between thinking like a lawyer and other forms of critical thinking lies in the
lawyer’s ability to spot and define a legal problem and then utilize the relevant facts and legal
rules necessary to resolve that problem in their client’s favor.57
The case-dialogue method is adeptly used in the training of law students to think like
lawyers.58 As discussed previously, it was Langdell’s hope that students would extrapolate
“scientific” legal principles from the relevant facts provided in a case report.59 In order to deduce
such “scientific” legal principles, students must make distinctions between relevant and
irrelevant facts, while spotting substantive legal issues.60 Langdell’s case-dialogue method
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approach encourages students to adopt the type of critical thinking typically associated with
thinking like a lawyer.
The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching explained the impact the
case-dialogue method had on students in a 2006 report on the status of American legal
education.61 The report argued that the extrapolation of legal principles from the narrow sets of
facts provided in casebook opinions discouraged moral inquiry into the law.62 As described in
the report, the case-dialogue method's categorization of complex human interactions and
conflicts into neat factual boxes discourages the “thinking through [of] the social consequences
or ethical aspects of the conclusions.”63 The Carnegie Report concluded that this model of legal
education warns students “not to let their moral concerns or compassion for the people in the
cases they discuss cloud their legal analysis.”64
If Langdell’s fundamental presumption was correct, mainly that law is a type of natural
science, then the case-dialogue method’s failure to initiate moral inquiry is of little concern.
Surely, if the law consists of unequivocally valid principles that produce good law, one need
only discover those principles and apply them to new situations. If this were the case, moral
inquiry, indeed, would serve only to cloud the analysis of scientific legal principles.
Langdell’s fundamental presumption, however, is not correct. In his discussion of
Langdell’s pedagogy, Edward Rubin asserts: “the idea that law is a type of natural science is
obsolete in its entirety.”65 Rubin recognizes the current belief that the social sciences “provide
the most useful analogies for the academic study of law in the sense, that they, like law, are
“human sciences.”66 Rubin explains how most scholars’ conception of the law is sociological.67
The law, in this regard, is seen as a construction of society’s cultural values.68 Rubin laments the
failure of legal curriculum to recognize such a change:
35
THE WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW RAZA JOURNAL

VOLUME 1

Spring 2010

PART 1

[S]tudents of politics learned a great many lessons in the forty years after 1870,
among them the idea that the real world, and not a library, is the true laboratory of
the human sciences. Legal academics needed another seventy years or so to learn
this, and they have not yet applied those lessons to the law school curriculum.69
Modern scholarship has displaced Langdell’s premise of the law’s scientific objectivity.
Yet, the case-dialogue method is still the primary pedagogical tool in the modern law school
curriculum.70 As we shall see, the repercussions of stubbornly adhering to a faulty analytical
framework go beyond the discouragement of moral inquiry within legal analysis. However,
before we discuss the pedagogy’s influence on issues of race and the law, we must first
acknowledge the existence of whiteness as a racial category. This is done next.
IV. THE POWER AND PRIVILEGES OF WHITENESS
“Whites spend a lot of time trying to persuade ourselves and each other that racism has
nothing to do with us. A big step would be for whites to admit that we do benefit from
racism and then to consider what to do about it.”71
-

Stephanie Wildman

When I first heard the term critical race theory, an image of a black man came into my
head. In contrast, when someone provides a description of an individual, and that individual’s
race is not specified, I readily assume that the person described is white.72 Moreover, as a white
person, I can curse, spit and eat with my mouth open without having others attribute my behavior
with the poor morality or civility of my race.73 Simply put, whiteness operates as the racial
norm.74 As the normative standard for race, whiteness often goes unperceived.75 Barbara Flagg
describes whites’ unconsciousness of whiteness as the transparency phenomenon.76 In her
description of the transparency phenomenon, Flagg notes:
White people externalize race. For most whites, most of the time, to think or
speak about race is to think or speak about people of color, or perhaps, at times, to
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reflect on oneself (or other whites) in relation to people of color. But we tend not
to think of ourselves or our racial cohort as racially distinctive. Whites’
“consciousness” of whiteness is predominantly unconsciousness of whiteness.77
Having the option to ignore race is a privilege of whiteness. The dynamics of
white privilege, however, extend beyond not having to think about race. In her article,
White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack, Peggy McIntosh provides a
conceptual framework for understanding white privilege. McIntosh describes white
privilege as an invisible knapsack of unearned assets.78 These assets, such as passports,
clothes, guides, and blank checks are especially difficult for whites to notice.79
Whites can rely on cashing in the assets of their whiteness throughout many of
their lived experiences.80 The assets are extensive and can be used in a variety of
situations. McIntosh provides a number of examples: whites need not worry that their
children will be provided a curriculum that testifies to the existence of their race;81 whites
can be relatively confident that if they need to talk to “the person in charge” that person
will be white;82 whites are never asked to be the “spokeswoman” for their racial group.83
The conceptualization of white privilege as an invisible knapsack is valuable
because it helps to deconstruct the transparency of whiteness and white privilege. As
McIntosh describes:
Describing white privilege makes one newly accountable. As we in Women’s
Studies work to reveal male privilege and ask men to give up some of their power,
so one who writes about having white privilege must ask, “Having described it,
what will I do to lessen or end it?”84
The benefits of white privilege go beyond the private, everyday effects discussed
by McIntosh. Cheryl Harris testifies to the systemic nature of white privilege in her
article, Whiteness as Property. As the title suggests, Harris argues that whiteness operates
as a form of property.85 Harris uses the histories of African slavery and Native American
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land conquest to trace the “evolution of whiteness from color to race to status to
property.”86 Harris’ historical analysis leads her to conclude: “The law’s construction of
whiteness defined and affirmed critical aspects of identity (who is white); of privilege
(what benefits accrue to that status); and, of property (what legal entitlements arise from
that status).”87 Harris concludes that the legal entitlements of whiteness continue to be
protected today.88
The work of McIntosh and Harris make visible the ways an unconsciousness of
whiteness perpetuates hidden systems of oppression. Whites interested in racial justice
must acknowledge their own whiteness and its corresponding privileges.89 Whites,
however, have a tendency to equate race consciousness with prejudice.90 Many whites,
fearful of appearing prejudiced, claim to be “colorblind” when it comes to race.91 A
colorblind approach implies that racism is nonexistent or has been defeated.92 McIntosh
and Harris debunk the notion that we live in a post-racial environment. Their message
reveals the importance of exploring racial privilege through active race consciousness.93
As a white man that grew up in a white family, I know that race consciousness is
difficult for most whites. Race consciousness forces whites to confront their own
relationship with systems of oppression. Uncovering one’s connection to racial
subordination is uncomfortable. Indeed, the label of “racist” is vilifying. This is so
because whites are taught to associate racism with individualistic discriminatory
treatment.94 Yet the singular association of racism with discrimination obscures its
corollary: privilege.95 With racial privilege unacknowledged, terms like racism become
pigeonholed in their meaning. The racist is associated with the Ku Klux Klan member
and the skinhead. The white not engaged in overt racial bigotry is classified as neutral or
38
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nonracist, despite enjoying the daily benefits of white privilege. It is difficult for whites,
comfortably entrenched in their neutrality, to confront the ways in which their identity
contributes to racial subordination.
The remainder of this paper is an attempt to escape that comfort zone. The next
section juxtaposes the case-dialogue method’s false presumption of legal objectivity with
the call for racial consciousness.
V. THE CASE-DIALOGUE METHOD’S PERPETUATION OF WHITE PRIVILEGE
“To assume the air of perspectivelessness that is expected in the classroom,
minority students must participate in the discussion as though they were not
African-American or Latino, but colorless legal analysts.”96
- Kimberle Crenshaw
An understanding of white privilege sheds a particularly unfavorable light on Langdell’s
case-dialogue method. The false presumption of the case-dialogue method, objectivity, stems
from Langdell’s incorrect understanding of the law as a natural science.97 Langdell made this
assumption at a time when nearly all lawmakers, legal educators, and law students were white.
Thus, far from interrogating whiteness, the case-dialogue method affirms the transparency
phenomenon by assigning whiteness as the objective value. Langdell’s legacy lives on, as most
contemporary legal educators disregard the discussion of race in the classroom.98 Law students,
in turn, are taught to adopt a colorblind approach to the law.99
This academic environment places minority law students in compromising positions.
Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, a law professor and critical race theorist, examined the minority
law student experience in her article, Foreword: Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in Legal
Education.100 Crenshaw began with the assumption that minority law students often have
39
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different values, beliefs, and experiences than their classmates and professors.101 Crenshaw
found that these differences are rarely discussed in a law school classroom because of the
dominant assumption that legal analysis should be objective.102 As described by Crenshaw, the
objectivity of legal analysis is presumed to posit “an analytical stance that has no specific
cultural, political, or class characteristics.”103 Crenshaw coins this mode of analysis
“perspectivelessness.”104
Crenshaw explains how the analysis of legal issues through the mode of
perspectivelessness effects minority law students.105 Crenshaw begins with a discussion of
perspectivelessness itself:
While it seems relatively straightforward that objects, issues, and other
phenomena are interpreted from the vantage point of the observer, many law
classes are conducted as though it is possible to create, weigh, and evaluate rules
and arguments in ways that neither reflect nor privilege any particular perspective
or world view. Thus, law school discourse proceeds with the expectation that
students will learn to perform the standard mode of legal reasoning and embrace
its presumption of perspectivelessness.106
Crenshaw argues that this dichotomy places minority students in a compromising
position.107 Operating within the case-dialogue method leaves minority law students with one of
two options.108 They may choose to deny their identity and analyze issues “objectively” within
the Langdellian framework.109 Or they may accept and assert their identity and risk being
ostracized for failing to think like a lawyer.110 Thus, if a minority student wants to participate in
the “objective” discussion of a court’s reasoning she must leave her racial identity at the door
and put on the hat of a supposedly colorless legal analyst. Crenshaw describes the consequences
of such an analysis:
The consequence of adopting this colorless mode is that when the discussion
involves racial minorities, minority students are expected to stand apart from their
40
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history, their identity, and sometimes their own immediate circumstances and
discuss issues without making reference to the reality that the “they” or “them”
being discussed is from their perspective “we” or “us.”111
The result is a classroom environment that actively encourages the silencing of minority
students.112 Forced to stand apart from their own self, minorities are generally more reluctant
than their white counterparts to speak in the classroom.113
The silencing of minority law students supports both the private, everyday forms of white
privilege discussed by Peggy McIntosh and the public, more systemic forms of white privilege
discussed by Cheryl Harris. In reference to the everyday privilege discussed by McIntosh, the
white law student can complete the assigned reading and answer a professor’s questions in class,
assured that the legal reasoning asked of them will affirm their racial identity and history. This
privilege is as much an asset as the property hornbook sitting inside the white student’s
backpack.114 The white student, while sitting in class, unhindered by thoughts of identity,
remains oblivious to the systemic forms of racial subordination embedded within the law.
In reference to the systemic forms of white privilege discussed by Harris, discussions of
whiteness as property never occur, as the voices that have the power to reveal the law’s
endorsement of racial subordination are silenced. In the cruelest of ironies, the minority law
student works within a legal educational system that produces “students who are dedicated to the
maintenance of the status quo, even though that status quo is oppressive to them.”115
The premise of objectivity, the bedrock of the case-dialogue pedagogy, creates a
classroom environment steeped in an unconsciousness of whiteness. The pedagogy subordinates
minority law students and preserves white privilege. Possibilities for change are discussed next.
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VI. A DIFFERENT WAY TO LEARN THE LAW
“Education either functions as an instrument which is used to facilitate the
integration of the younger generation into the logic of the present system and
bring about conformity to it, or it becomes “the practice of freedom,” the means
by which men and women deal critically and creatively with reality and discover
how to participate in the transformation of their world.” 116
- Richard Shaull
Derrick Bell, a prominent critical race theorist, has suggested that white self-interest is
the primary motivation of racial progress.117 As a white law student, I take Bell’s suggestion as a
challenge. I believe Bell is challenging all of those with racial privilege to work towards
developing racial equality in ways that are not motivated by self-interest.
The prevalence of Langdell’s case-dialogue method pedagogy represents the failure of
law schools, as predominately white institutions, to accept Bell’s challenge. If law schools took
white privilege seriously, they would not adopt a pedagogical approach that supports the faulty
notion of perspectiveless legal analysis. If law schools took white privilege seriously, they would
not create a classroom environment that places students in compromising positions due to their
minority status. If law schools took white privilege seriously, they would not disguise the
systemic forms of subordination embedded within the law.
I am not the first to argue that traditional legal pedagogy fails to interrogate the
relationship between race, whiteness and the law.118 In a recent work, Margalynne Armstrong
and Stephanie Wildman argue for the adoption of “color insight” within the law school
curriculum.119 Armstrong and Wildman stress the importance of talking about race, particularly
whiteness, in the law school classroom.120 Armstrong and Wildman argue that the need to
discuss race, and whiteness, arises from the fact that traditional legal pedagogy “tends to
42
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‘whitewash’ law, ignoring the roles of whiteness and privilege in the construction of legal rules,
institutions and the application of law.”121 After describing the need to talk about race, their
conclusion provides a number of suggestions for the improvement of racial dialogue, both
institutionally and in the classroom.122 Institutionally, an expansion of forums that discuss issues
of racial justice is suggested.123 Possible forums include social justice centers, film series, and
reading groups facilitated by faculty.124 In the classroom, assigned reading and discussion of
different theoretical perspectives, ranging from critical race theory to law and economics, is
suggested.125
Armstrong and Wildman’s suggestions are unquestionably valuable. Their approach is
pragmatic. Assigning a broader reading list can immediately be added to a professor’s syllabus.
All law schools could open their auditorium or largest classroom a couple times a month for a
film series focused on issues of race. These practical suggestions would help both students and
faculty understand the role of race, particularly whiteness, in the law and the law school setting.
An understanding of Langdell’s faulty analytical framework bolsters Armstrong and
Wildman’s argument for color insight in the law school classroom. In my view, however, legal
educators should go beyond Armstrong and Wildman’s suggestions for “setting a context for
talking about race and whiteness”126 and adopt a pedagogy that fully interrogates the casedialogue method’s false assumption of objectivity.
I am not suggesting that every first-year Property case should be deconstructed by neoMarxist thought.127 However, similarly to Armstrong and Wildman, I do feel that the formal
incorporation of theory within the legal curriculum would help students deconstruct legal
reasoning’s supposed objectivity.128 Many legal scholars, especially those enamored with the
traditional American liberal legal system, are critical of the incorporation of theory within legal
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studies, arguing that the incorporation of theory abandons the objectivity and importance of
law.129 Yet the pedagogy I propose would not seek to abandon the law.130 As described by
Duncan Kennedy, I envision a pedagogy that allows students “to think about the law in a way
that will allow one to enter into it, to criticize without utterly rejecting it, and to manipulate it
without self-abandonment to their system of thinking and doing.”131 It is there, working within a
knowingly flawed legal system, where students could constructively and productively challenge
the legitimacy of the legal rules and reasoning they are taught to adopt.
A model approach would be similar to John Calmore’s understanding of legal education
“as the practice of freedom.”132 Calmore argues that “traditional approaches to teaching that
simply reinforce domination” must be abandoned.133 Calmore’s pedagogy directly challenges the
decontextualized reading of cases endorsed by the case-dialogue method. The core tenets of his
pedagogy are succinctly outlined in the Preface of the text he uses in his Antidiscrimination Law
course:
Our primary goal is to enable students to read law critically with a special
sensitivity to the ways in which legal techniques, rhetorical strategies, and
legal practices reproduce patterns of power and privilege that work to
subordinate people based on categories of identity. The materials are
designed to reveal these strategies through close readings of the language
and underlying assumptions in judicial opinions. Students are encouraged
to examine legal opinions for their similarities and differences in
approaches to power and privilege across identity categories and to
compare them with insights garnered from the wide range of multidisciplinary scholarly excerpts surrounding the case texts.134
A pedagogy based on Calmore’s approach would adopt Armstrong and Wildman’s notion
of color insight, while also interrogating Langdell’s incorrect assumption of legal objectivity. It
would be a critical study of the law. It would challenge white privilege. It would be a more
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honest, challenging and intellectual approach than the current model. It would be a better legal
education.
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